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Business ethics and corporate governance in the Second King Report: 
Farsighted or futile? 
The relationship between corporate governance and business ethics has 
always been ambiguous. Does corporate governance per definition have 
an ethical nature or is it merely self-interested? Is business ethics an 
integral part of corporate governance or is it marginalised or even excluded 
by the debate on corporate governance? Does corporate governance also 
include the governance of ethics? 
This article will focus on the relationship between corporate governance 
and business ethics from the perspective of a developing country. More 
specifically, it will look at a recent development in South Africa where the 
Second Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (IOD, 2002), 
also known as the Second King Report, gave particular prominence to 
business ethics. The motivation for its emphasis on business ethics as well 
as its guidelines for the corporate governance of ethics will be explored 
and, in conclusion, critically reviewed. 
Opsomming 
Besigheidsetiek en korporatiewe beheer in die die Tweede King Verslag: 
versiende of futiel? 
Die relasie tussen korporatiewe beheer en besigheidsetiek was nog altyd 
onduidelik. Het korporatiewe beheer per definisie ’n etiese aard, of is dit 
bloot gerig op korporatiewe eiebelang? Is besigheidsetiek ’n integrale deel 
van korporatiewe beheer, of word dit na die kantlyn geskuif en selfs 
uitgesluit van die debat oor korporatiewe beheer? Impliseer korporatiewe 
beheer ook beheer oor korporatiewe etiek? 
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In hierdie artikel word vanuit ’n ontwikkelende ekonomie-perspektief 
gefokus op die relasie tussen korporatiewe beheer en etiek. Daar word 
spesifiek gekyk na ’n onlangse verwikkeling in Suid-Afrika, waar die 
Second Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (IOD, 2002), ook 
bekend as die Tweede King Verslag, besondere prominensie aan besig-
heidsetiek verleen het. Die motivering vir hierdie beklemtoning van besig-
heidsetiek, asook die riglyne wat vir die korporatiewe beheer van etiek 
verskaf is, word in die artikel ondersoek en daarna in die konklusie van die 
artikel krities geëvalueer. 
1. Introduction 
Corporate governance has enjoyed unprecedented attention around the 
globe over the last decade. There are various reasons for its recent 
prominence. These reasons are very context-specific. In some (mostly 
developed economy) contexts its prominence was driven by the agency 
problem (Collier & Robberts, 2001:67) and investor activism (Rossouw, 
2002:137), whilst in other (mostly developing economy) contexts it was 
driven by the desire to attract foreign investment and to gain national and 
international legitimacy (Chernoff, 1999:2). 
The relationship between corporate governance and business ethics has 
always been ambiguous. Does corporate governance per definition have 
an ethical nature or is it merely self-interested? Is business ethics an 
integral part of corporate governance or is it marginalised or even ex-
cluded by the debate on corporate governance? Does corporate 
governance also include the governance of ethics? 
This article will focus on the relationship between corporate governance 
and business ethics from the perspective of a developing country. More 
specifically, it will look at a recent development in South Africa where the 
Second Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (2002), also 
known as the Second King Report, gave particular prominence to 
business ethics. The motivation for its emphasis on business ethics as 
well as its guidelines for the corporate governance of ethics will be 
explored and, in conclusion, also critically reviewed. 
2. Corporate governance and ethics 
A distinction can be drawn between corporate governance in the broad 
and in the narrow sense of the word (James, 2001:236; Rossouw et al., 
2002). In the broad sense of the word corporate governance refers to 
control over companies externally exerted. For example, the state and 
the judiciary exercise this external control over companies (Coffee, 
1998:69; Romano, 1998:144). The state may also opt for delegating 
some of its control functions over companies to regulatory bodies. 
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Alternatively, parties with a stake in the activity of companies can form 
self-regulatory bodies and seek statutory status for themselves. All of 
these arrangements combine to form the landscape of broad corporate 
governance. The purpose of such controls over the operations of 
companies is not only to set ground rules that will ensure the protection 
of all stakeholders in corporate action, but also to prevent the market as 
such from failing due to malpractices (Romano, 1998:148). 
Corporate governance in the narrow sense of the word is concerned with 
the internal governance of companies. The Cadbury Report on corporate 
governance in the UK introduced a brief and widely used definition of 
corporate governance in this narrow sense of the word: “the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled” (Smerdon, 1998:1). This 
article will focus on corporate governance in this latter sense. 
The responsibility for corporate governance lies with the board of 
directors and usually implies four functions: strategic direction, executive 
action, supervision and accountability (Reinecke, 1996:11). The board of 
directors is consequently held responsible for determining the strategic 
direction of the company as well as for taking those decisions that will 
steer the company in that direction. As the managers of the company are 
carrying out the board’s decisions, the board of directors also has the 
added responsibility of supervising the management function of the 
company to ensure that it serves the chosen strategic direction. In all of 
this they need to be accountable to the stakeholders of the company and 
be able to assure them that the actions taken by the board are serving 
their best interests. 
The relationship between corporate governance and business ethics is 
an ambiguous one. If by “ethical” we mean that one should not only 
consider what is good for oneself, but also consider the good of others, 
then the question arises whether corporate governance by its very nature 
is premised upon moral obligations. The four core values of corporate 
governance, viz., fairness, accountability, responsibility and transparency 
at least create the impression that corporate governance imposes ethical 
obligations upon corporations. The ethical nature of corporate govern-
ance is, however, largely determined by how “stakeholders” are defined 
within corporate governance. In this regard one can distinguish between 
exclusive and inclusive definitions of stakeholders. When stakeholders 
are exclusively defined as shareholders, corporate governance only has 
a very restricted ethical nature. In that case directors are regarded as the 
agents of shareholders and in that capacity they have to direct and 
control the company to the benefit of the shareholders. Although the four 
pillars of corporate governance: fairness, accountability, responsibility 
and transparency still apply, they are restricted in their application to the 
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interests of shareholders. They do not apply to the interests of other 
stakeholders of the business. Thus the only ethical dimension that can 
be indicated in this respect is the limited ethical responsibility of directors 
towards shareholders. Collier and Roberts (2001:68) state in this respect: 
“The only ethical imperative at work here is a Friedmanesque dictum to 
pursue profit maximization”. By restricting moral obligations to share-
holders only, the interests of other stakeholders are only considered 
insofar as they have strategic or instrumental significance for share-
holders. When the interests of non-shareholding stakeholders do not 
have any strategic impact on shareholder interests, they can be 
neglected in terms of an exclusive stakeholder approach. In an attempt 
to remedy the obvious exclusion of the interests of other stakeholders 
inherent in this approach, some argue that stakeholders other than 
shareholders, for example employees and local communities, will 
automatically benefit, in trickle-down fashion, from the profit-optimisation 
of shareholders (Maitland, 2001:140).  
When stakeholders are more inclusively defined as all parties who are 
affected by or who affect the company, then corporate governance gains 
a distinctively ethical character. Within this notion of corporate govern-
ance, directors take on a stewardship role and consequently have to be 
fair, accountable, responsible and transparent towards all stakeholders of 
the company. The interests of shareholders are not excluded, but are 
balanced with the interests of other stakeholders. This does not imply 
that profit-optimisation is abandoned as a corporate objective. To the 
contrary, within the corporate governance debate, Germany and Japan 
are often cited as examples where more inclusive stakeholder approach-
es resulted in improved financial performance and profit-optimisation. 
This of course does not prevent others from expressing grave concerns 
about the viability of these more inclusive stakeholder approaches, as 
they fear that responsibility towards all stakeholders can result in a lack 
of corporate focus and ultimately in financial disaster (Halpern, 2000:49; 
Maitland, 2001:129). 
Besides the question whether the concept of corporate governance has 
an ethical nature, there is a further question: Does corporate governance 
exclude or include the governance of company ethics? Does corporate 
governance imply that directors should also take responsibility for the 
ethics strategy, the execution of ethics, the supervision of ethics and the 
accountability of the companies’ ethics they serve? Or should directors 
merely be concerned about the implications of the core values of cor-
porate governance, namely fairness, accountability, responsibility and 
transparency for matters such as board composition, executive re-
muneration, disclosure etc.? 
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Once more, judging from corporate governance codes around the globe, 
opinions are divided on this question. This difference of opinion does not 
coincide with the divide between exclusive and inclusive definitions of 
stakeholders discussed above. Countries that opt for inclusive definitions 
of stakeholders do not necessarily regard the corporate governance of 
ethics as a board responsibility. 
In the remainder of this article, I will discuss and review the corporate 
governance code of a developing country that not only opted for an 
inclusive stakeholder approach, but also opted for directors to take 
responsibility for the corporate governance of ethics. This country is 
South Africa, where the Second Report on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa was published in March 2002. 
3. The Second King Report on corporate governance for 
South Africa 
The King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 2002 (also 
known as the Second King Report), named after the chairperson of the 
committee who drafted the report, Judge Mervyn King, is the successor 
code to the King Report on Corporate Governance for the South Africa of 
1994. 
3.1 Inclusive stakeholder approach 
The Second King Report not only opts for an inclusive stakeholder 
approach (referred to as a “participative corporate governance system” in 
the report, p. 7), but also assigns responsibility for the corporate 
governance of ethics to the board of directors. In a section of the report 
titled, “Integrated Sustainability Reporting”, it discusses the responsi-
bilities of the board of directors with regard to the social, ethical and 
environmental performance of the corporation. The report makes it clear 
that the social, ethical and environmental performance of the corporation 
crucially determine whether the corporation will be able to sustain its 
financial performance. By social performance the report implies the moral 
obligations of corporations towards social transformation issues such as 
black economic empowerment and human capital development. By 
ethical performance it refers to the standards of corporate behaviour or 
integrity, and by environmental performance it alludes to the obligation to 
protect the natural ecology. This detailed and explicit emphasis on social, 
ethical and environmental obligations has been hailed as a “world first” 
for corporate governance reports (KPMG, 2001). 
A close reading of the Second King Report reveals that the report is 
informed by the contemporary theoretical discourse on corporations and 
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their moral obligations. The view of the corporation that underlies the 
report is one that contradicts Friedman’s idea (1970) that corporations 
have no other moral obligations than making profits for their share-
holders. It rather supports French’s view (1979) that corporations can 
and should be regarded as moral actors. Like Evan and Freeman (1993) 
and Goodpaster (1991), it contends that corporations have moral obliga-
tions to a wide range of stakeholders. 
This stakeholder notion of the corporation is reflected in the report’s 
option for an inclusive stakeholder approach as well as in its recommen-
dation that the board of directors should take responsibility for the 
corporate governance of ethics. The following considerations that are 
explicitly mentioned in the report confirm this value orientation: 
• Sustainability 
• License to operate 
• Social power 
• Good corporate citizenship 
• Societal values 
• Corporate reputation 
Each of these motivations will subsequently be discussed in some more 
detail. 
3.2 Value orientation 
3.2.1  Sustainability 
The thinking behind the Second King Report’s commitment to an 
inclusive stakeholder approach seems to be guided by the ideal of 
corporations with “sustained business success and steady, long-term 
growth in shareowner value” (IOD, 2002:8). Stakeholders are defined in 
the report as “those upon whose co-operation and creativity it [the 
corporation] depends for its survival and prosperity” (IOD, 2002:98). This 
implies that the ideal of sustainability can only be achieved when a 
company succeeds in gaining and retaining the support of its various 
stakeholders. Their ongoing support of the company will ultimately 
determine whether it will be able to continue as a “going concern”. The 
dependence of companies upon their stakeholders is formally recognised 
in the Second King Report through its recommendation that boards of 
companies should engage regularly with stakeholders. The report ad-
vises boards to identify their key stakeholders and determine what 
expectations these stakeholders have of the company. Boards should 
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also give an account of how they have catered for the interests of these 
key stakeholder groups and then disclose regularly to these stakeholder 
groups how the company has acted in their mutual best interest. 
3.2.2  License to operate 
The Second King Report further recognises that a company needs more 
than legal approval to continue its operations. It also needs to be 
legitimised by its stakeholders and the community in which it operates. 
The ongoing process of being legitimised by its stakeholders, is referred 
to as the company’s “license to operate” (IOD, 2002:8). The “licence to 
operate” is earned through responsible behaviour that demonstrates to 
its stakeholders that the company’s existence is to the mutual benefit of 
the company and all its stakeholders. According to the Second King 
Report, the stakeholders from whom the company receives its license to 
operate includes, among others, groups like the state, investigative 
media, ethical pressure groups, consumers, employees and communi-
ties. In order to secure its license to operate, the report recommends that 
boards of companies engage regularly with these stakeholder groups. 
3.2.3  Social power 
A further motivation for the inclusive stakeholder approach adopted by 
the Second King Report is based upon the social power and influence of 
corporations in society. The report recognises the fact that modern 
corporations often have a more immediate presence and a more 
immediate impact on citizens than the state. They often determine, to a 
greater extent than the state, the quality of individual and community life. 
This increased social power and influence of corporations yield added 
responsibilities for the boards of companies. Although not explicitly 
stated, the Second King Report hints that if boards of companies do not 
take explicit charge of the added responsibilities that go with their social 
power, they will either be forced by the state to take that responsibility, or 
they will have to bear the brunt of the resentment of special interest 
groups, the media or local communities. The report therefore opts for a 
pro-active approach where boards of directors willingly take responsibility 
for their social impact and engage with their stakeholders in order to 
ensure that the interests of all who are affected by the operations of the 
company are catered and cared for. In this regard the report sounds a 
warning to boards that “in the age of electronic information and activism 
no company can escape the adverse consequences of poor governance” 
(IOD, 2002:10). 
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3.2.4  Good corporate citizenship 
The option for an inclusive stakeholder approach is also motivated by 
claiming that it is imperative for companies to act as good corporate 
citizens within society. Good corporate citizenship does not only entail 
respecting laws and human rights and refraining from discrimination and 
exploitation. It also entails strengthening and developing the societies in 
which companies operate. This implies that companies should become 
involved in the most pertinent developmental issues in the contexts 
where they operate. Those issues that have a direct bearing on the 
success of companies should be addressed specifically. Within the South 
African context the report identifies at least three such areas that should 
figure prominently as part of the social responsibility of companies. They 
are: 
• Black Economic Empowerment: the inclusion of black people in the 
mainstream of economic activity in order to facilitate a more equitable 
distribution of wealth. Affirmative action is considered an important 
aspect of this process. 
• Health: HIV/AIDS is singled out as a challenge since “current 
indications show that over 20% of South Africa’s economically active 
population will be directly affected within the next five years” (IOD, 
2002:109). 
• Human development: The development of human capital is consider-
ed a high priority, not only because of educational deficits caused by 
Apartheid, but also because enterprises are in need of well educated 
and trained employees. 
The commitment to good corporate citizenship advocated in the Second 
King Report thus stems from the conviction that strong sustainable 
companies require strong sustainable societies to survive and prosper. 
This is evident when the report justifies its option for an inclusive 
approach to corporate governance in contrast to an exclusively share-
owner approach by stating that “any company’s long term commercial 
success is inextricably linked to the sustainable development of the 
social and economic communities within which it operates” (IOD, 2002: 
98). Constructive responses to these developmental needs of the society 
require that companies should form partnerships with communities, local 
and national governments and other stakeholders in order to be effective. 
Once more the report implies that this responsibility for good corporate 
citizenship lies with the board of directors. 
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3.2.5  Societal values 
A further motivation provided to justify an inclusive stakeholder approach 
revolves around the societal value system within which corporate 
governance is designed and practised. Underlying this motivation is the 
assumption that there is no one universally valid corporate governance 
system. To the contrary, corporate governance systems should reflect 
the uniqueness of the societies in which they originate. Specific refer-
ence is made to value system that Africans across the African continent 
embrace. This African value system is sometimes captured under the 
term Ubuntu which signifies a commitment to co-existence, consensus 
and consultation (IOD, 2002:19, also see Shonhiwa, 2001a & 2001b:19). 
By affirming these African values the report seems to suggest that 
corporate governance systems of African countries should reflect this 
value orientation. Such an orientation would render an exclusive focus on 
shareholders’ interest impossible, as it would fly in the face of values 
such as co-existence, consensus and consultation. 
3.2.6  Corporate reputation 
A final motivation for the Second King Report’s inclusive stakeholder 
approach is based upon the importance of corporate reputation. This 
argument is based on the obligation of directors to protect company 
assets. These assets do not only include physical assets, but also the 
symbolic assets of companies. Prominent among the symbolic assets is 
the reputation of the company as this not only impacts on its market 
valuation, but also on its ability to attract investment, clients and talented 
staff. Reputation is described in the report as “a function of stakeholder 
perception of a company’s integrity and efficiency” (IOD, 2002:98). By 
implication this means that boards need to engage regularly with stake-
holders in order to gauge what their current perceptions of the company 
are.  
Unlike the previous five arguments that all maintained a balance between 
the interests of the company and those of its stakeholders, the last 
argument is merely concerned about the company’s reputation in order 
to protect its own assets. Despite its lesser orientation on the interests of 
stakeholders, it nevertheless serves as a motivation for adopting an 
inclusive stakeholder approach to corporate governance. 
The above six arguments all double as a justification for the report’s 
recommendation that the board should take responsibility for the 
corporate governance of ethics. It seems as if the authors of the report 
assumed that board commitment to an inclusive stakeholder corporate 
governance system automatically also implies that the board should take 
responsibility for translating that commitment into a system that will 
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ensure that all employees of the company honour this commitment to 
serve the best interest of all stakeholders. 
The report recommends that boards implement a best practice model for 
the corporate governance of ethics that consists of the following aspects: 
• Determining stakeholder perceptions and expectations of the 
company 
• Codifying ethical standards of the company 
• Institutionalising ethics on the strategic and system levels of the 
company 
• Monitoring ethics performance 
• Communicating about and training on ethics 
• Rewarding ethical conduct and/or disciplining unethical conduct 
• Providing safe systems for reporting unethical or risky behaviour 
• Accounting and auditing ethics performance 
• Disclosing ethics performance to stakeholders 
3.3 Farsighted or futile? 
The Second King Report’s inclusive stakeholder approach combined with 
its recommendations on the corporate governance of ethics discussed 
above extends these two dimensions much further than most other 
corporate governance reports around the globe. The question that I want 
to pose and answer in this concluding part of the paper is whether the 
corporate governance model proposed by the Second King Report is 
farsighted and should therefore be taken seriously in at least other 
developing economies, or whether it is a futile approach that does not 
warrant serious attention. 
The main argument for the futility of the Second King Report’s approach 
to corporate governance most probably is the one that states that the 
purpose of developing good corporate governance in developing 
economies is to enable companies “to compete for capital in a global 
market” (Chernoff, 1999:2). In order to compete successfully for capital, 
developing countries need to simulate the corporate governance systems 
and approaches of those developed economies where capital is most 
likely to come from. In the case of Africa that means that the Western-
style corporate governance models and practices of the USA and EU 
need to be adopted. Because institutional investors from that part of the 
world are comfortable with and prefer these corporate governance 
standards they will be more likely to invest in economies where they see 
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the same corporate governance standards being adhered to. Since the 
existing corporate governance models in at least the Anglo-American 
world are premised upon an exclusive shareholder approach, the Second 
King Report’s option for an inclusive stakeholder approach might not be 
palatable to Western institutional investors. It might therefore be suggest-
ed that the Second King Report’s approach to corporate governance 
defeats the purpose of the exercise and is therefore an exercise in futility. 
This argument is flawed in a number of ways and contradicts recent 
findings in comparative corporate governance research. In concluding 
this paper, this argument will be dismissed by exposing three flaws in it. 
The first flaw in the above argument relates to the implied notion that 
there is a universally accepted best standard of corporate governance. 
This flies in the face of evidence that indicates that corporate governance 
is always context-specific. These findings are also emphasised in the 
OECD guidelines for corporate governance, where one of the guiding 
principles states that “International guidelines must recognize the 
international differences in governance systems” (Berglöf & Von Thad-
den, 2000:300; OECD, 1999:10). The distinction between market and 
control models of corporate governance emphasises why corporate 
governance models need to differ according to the context in which they 
apply. The diagram below highlights the differences between the two 
models. 
Market model Control model 
Shareholder environment 
• Dispersed ownership 
• Sophisticated institutional invest-
ment 
Shareholder environment 
• Concentrated ownership 
• Family, bank & public finance 
Capital market liquidity 
• Active private equity market 
• Active take-over market 
Capital market liquidity 
• Under-developed new issue mar-
ket 
• Limited take-over market 
(Adapted from KPMG, 2001) 
The above diagram demonstrates that the institutional landscapes differ 
considerably between the two models. Whereas the market model (which 
is typical of the Anglo-American context) is characterised by companies 
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that are widely owned, the control model (which is more typical of 
developing economies) is characterised by concentrated ownership by 
families, banks and the state. Similarly the market model is characterised 
by high take-over activity, whilst take-overs are relatively limited in the 
control-model. These differences between the two models suggest that 
corporate governance systems designed for contexts with widely owned 
companies and active take-over markets could hardly be appropriate and 
relevant for contexts with concentrated ownership of companies and 
limited take-over markets. 
This is confirmed by recent comparative corporate governance research 
that indicates that the widely held firm with dispersed shareholders is a 
rare phenomenon outside the Anglo-American world (Berglöf & Von 
Thadden, 2000:277; Sarkar & Sarkar, 2000:161). It therefore does not 
surprise that Halpern (2000:3), despite his stated preference for market 
model corporate governance systems, concludes that “the market-based 
system [of corporate governance] is not a viable alternative [for 
developing countries] in the short or medium term”. 
Admitting differences like the ones above should not, however, amount 
to admitting that good corporate governance is only possible within 
market model contexts. Good corporate governance is possible within 
both, even though the models themselves differ in many important 
respects. What matters is not the form of the corporate governance 
system, but whether it is true to the core values of good corporate 
governance, namely fairness, accountability, responsibility and trans-
parency. 
The second flaw in this argument is the suggestion that good corporate 
governance systems need to be exclusively shareholder orientated. 
There are both solid empirical and theoretical grounds for believing that 
an inclusive stakeholder approach can be as effective as an exclusive 
shareholder approach. The empirical evidence is provided by inclusive 
stakeholder corporate governance systems in developed countries with 
strong economies like Germany, France and Japan. In these countries at 
least employees are included in the corporate governance systems 
without adverse effects on the corporation (Jenkins-Ferrett, 2001:24). 
The theoretical ground for an inclusive stakeholder approach is provided 
by the investment-argument advocated by Etzioni and others (Etzioni, 
1998; Berglöf & Von Thadden, 2000:287-289). The investment argument 
is based upon the belief that investors should be rewarded for their 
investment in companies. This reward is not only in the form of benefits 
that accrue to them, but also the right to have a voice in the governance 
of the companies in which they have invested. This right to voice is 
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described by Etzioni (1998:683) as being “entitled to form a relationship 
with the users of their resources to help ensure that the usage will be in 
line with their interests and values”. In the case of shareholders this right 
to voice is exercised by voting for the appointment or removal of directors 
responsible for directing and controlling the companies they have invest-
ed in. 
If investment is defined as “the outlay of money, time or other resources, 
in something that offers (promises) a profitable return” (Etzioni, 1998: 
682), then other stakeholders should also be considered as investors. 
Employees for example can be regarded as investors, since they have 
committed their talents and energy to the firm. This is especially true in 
the case of long-serving employees who have been asked to make 
sacrifices to help a company survive or to reach higher targets. In similar 
fashion other stakeholder groups like local communities and creditors 
can also be regarded as investors and should therefore be equally 
entitled to benefits and voice. 
These empirical and theoretical arguments for the justification of an 
inclusive stakeholder approach can further be supported by a moral 
argument. The moral case for an inclusive stakeholder approach has, 
however, already been made earlier in this article and consequently will 
not be repeated here. 
A third flaw in the argument under discussion relates to its neglect of the 
specific conditions that often prevail in developing economies. By 
insisting that corporate governance systems of developed economies 
should also apply in developing economies, it neglects important social 
differences between the two contexts. In developing economies, com-
panies often need to take on responsibilities that are not normally 
considered the responsibility of companies in developed economies. In 
order to ensure stable and strong communities in which they can 
operate, companies in developing economies need to involve themselves 
in matters such as eradicating backlogs in education, training, health 
care etc., developing human capital and resourcing and reinforcing the 
legal system and its enforcing mechanisms. Attending effectively to these 
and other social and developmental needs requires a wider corporate 
governance agenda than in developed economies where the same 
responsibilities either do not exist or where it can be delegated to the 
state or organs of civil society. Neglecting these issues of crucial 
importance to developing countries could in fact constitute poor 
corporate governance as it might be considered a lack of corporate 
vision and control by the board of a company. Such lack of vision and 
competent governance can ultimately undermine the steady growth in 
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value of shareholder (and stakeholder) investments and the long term 
feasibility of the corporation itself. 
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